RT info:eu-repo/semantics/article
T1 Low interest rates and executive risk-taking incentives: Evidence from the United States
A1 Castro Castro, Paula
A1 Tascón Fernández, María Teresa
A1 Castaño Gutiérrez, Francisco Javier
A1 Amor Tapia, Borja
A2 Economia Financiera y Contabilidad
K1 Economía
K1 Finanzas
K1 Executive compensation
K1 Monetary policies
K1 Low interest rates
K1 Managers’ risk-taking incentives
K1 ZLB policy
AB [EN] This article contributes to the literature by indicating how certain monetary policies impact the compensation incentivesof US managers to adopt riskier business policies. Specifically, based on the agency problems between shareholders andmanagers and between shareholders and creditors, a research framework is developed to identify the influence of lowinterest rates on managers’ risk-taking incentives proxied by the sensitivity of executive compensation to stock returnvolatility (Vega). We examine 1,293 firms in the United States between 2000 and 2016, and the results indicate that lowinterest rates increase the managers’ short-term risk-taking incentives and that those incentives contribute to the riskeffectively taken by the firm. Our results are robust to the use of alternative monetary proxies and to the presence ofpassive versus active institutional shareholders.
PB Sage
SN 2340-9444
LK https://hdl.handle.net/10612/19066
UL https://hdl.handle.net/10612/19066
NO Castro Castro, P., Tascón Fernández, M. T., Castaño Gutiérrez, F. J., y Amor Tapia, B. (2021). Low interest rates and executive risk- taking incentives: Evidence from the united states. Business Research Quarterly, 24(4), 324-354. https://doi.org/10.1177/2340944420927716.
DS BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León
RD 20-may-2024