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Título
Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders?
Autor
Facultad/Centro
Área de conocimiento
Título de la revista
Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad
Número de la revista
2
Cita Bibliográfica
Sacristán-Navarro, M., Cabeza-García, L., y Gómez-Ansón, S. (2024). Family power in the boardroom: Is it counterbalanced by other large shareholders? Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad, 53(2), 203–231. https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2023.2197329
Editorial
Taylor & Francis
Fecha
2023
ISSN
0210-2412
Resumen
[EN] This study analyses how the existence, the number, their ownership, and the identity of other large shareholders coexisting with families, influence disproportionate family board power of listed firms. Using a database of the Spanish market over an 8-year period, the results show that the number of other large shareholders and their relative ownership over the family increase disproportionate family board power in the boardroom. Moreover, when the other large shareholders have more ownership than the family, disproportionate family board representation increases. The findings also highlight the significance of the other large shareholders’ identity. Foreign investors reduce disproportionate family board power, while it does not appear to be affected by families and individuals or institutional investors. In sum, this research confirms the use of disproportionate board power by families as a control-enhancing mechanism to entrench family power on the board and protect their socioemotional wealth.
Materia
Palabras clave
Peer review
SI
ID proyecto
- info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/AEI/ Programa Estatal de Generación de Conocimiento y Fortalecimiento Científico y Tecnológico del Sistema de I+D+i/ PID2019-105140RB-I00/ES/ DETERMINANTES DE LAS INNOVACIONES EMPRESARIALES ORIENTADAS A LA SOSTENIBILIDAD: CARACTERISTICAS DEL CONSEJO DE ADMINISTRACION, DE LA ALTA DIRECCION Y DEL CEO
URI
DOI
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