2024-03-29T11:47:35Zhttp://buleria.unileon.es/oai/requestoai:buleria.unileon.es:10612/52252020-12-10T09:10:57Zcom_10612_17col_10612_22
Qualified voting mechanisms
Martínez Rico, Ricardo
Moreno, Bernardo
Economia Aplicada
Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Empresariales
Economía
Estadística
Sociología
Procedimiento electoral
We study voting mechanisms, which consist of two elements: a profile of sets of votes (this profile describes the votes that voters are allowed to cast) and a voting scheme (which explains how to aggregate those votes). To investigate how these two elements interact, we impose some properties on the sets of votes (i.e., regularity ) and on the voting scheme (i.e., candidate monotonicity, candidate anonymity, and weak neutrality ). We characterize the family of voting schemes that satisfy some of those properties and analyze the role played by the structure of the sets of votes in these characterizations. Voting, approval voting rule, plurality rule, monotonicity, anonymity, neutrality, qualified voting
2014
2016-06-03T13:34:24Z
2016-06-03T13:34:24Z
2016-06-03
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
http://hdl.handle.net/10612/5225
eng
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
https://buleria.unileon.es/bitstream/10612/5225/4/WP-2014-02.pdf.jpg
Hispana
TEXT
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/CNE/1.0/
BULERIA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de León
http://hdl.handle.net/10612/5225