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2 An expert judgement approach to determine measures to remove
3 institutional barriers and economic non-market failures that restrict
4 photovoltaic self-consumption deployment in Spain
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20 **Abstract**

21 Despite the Spanish privileged geographical location and business leadership in the renewable energy
22 field, currently it can be observed that the solar photovoltaic generation, electric self-consumption systems
23 and net-metering policies deployment is much lower than it can be observed in other countries, even with
24 lower energy sources for self-consumption. Energy policy experts assess as main reason the absence of a
25 stable regulatory framework and the existence of clear disincentives. These disincentives are based on
26 several economic non-market failures and institutional barriers. One key factor has proven to be the
27 regulatory uncertainty created mainly by the recent national most relevant ministerial orders regarding
28 energy generation and consumption, which suggests that, *de facto*, the regulatory framework is currently
29 still under development. This paper includes first a brief but deep description of the prosumers penetration
30 existing scenario in Spain, and then it focuses on feasible strategies to accelerate higher solar photovoltaic
31 and self-consumption growth rates in Spain. Then, new policy measures to eliminate, or at least, mitigate,
32 current barriers to their deployment are proposed and discussed. It is concluded that it results mandatory
33 the urgent modernization of the energy regulatory framework promoting an active role for distributed PV
34 generation which could have a significant positive impact in the voltage control and frequency regulation
35 in distribution networks, among other advantages.
36

37 **Keywords:** Solar photovoltaic generation; Self-consumption; Prosumers, Energy policies, Institutional
38 barriers; Voltage control; Frequency regulation.

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41	Nomenclature	
42		
43	BIPV	Building Integrated Photovoltaics.
44	DRES	Distributed Renewable Energy Source.
45	DSO	Distribution System Operator.
46	CNMC	Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y de la Competencia (National Competition
47		Commission).
48	EEG	Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (German Renewable Energy Sources Act).
49	EU	European Union.
50	FiP	Feed-in Premium.
51	FiT	Feed-in Tariff.
52	GHG	Greenhouse gasses.
53	GW	Gigawatt.
54	IRR	Internal rate of return.
55	kW	Kilowatt.
56	kWh	Kilowatt hour.
57	kWp	Kilowatt peak power.
58	LCOE	Levelized Cost of Energy.
59	M€	Millions of euros.
60	MW	Megawatt.
61	PV	Photovoltaic.
62	R ²	Coefficient of determination.
63	RES	Renewable Energy Source.
64	toe	Ton of oil equivalent.
65	TSO	Transport System Operator.
66	TWh	Terawatt hour.
67	VAT	Value-added tax.

68 I. INTRODUCTION

69 The countries that participated in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in the
70 Agreement of Paris, hold on 12 December 2015, officially recognized the great impact of the climate
71 change effect on Earth and agreed to take urgent action by setting the limitation of global warming to
72 “*well below 2 °C*” compared to pre-industrial levels (NRDC, 2015). The Intergovernmental Panel on
73 Climate Change in its Fifth Assessment Report, published in 2014, identifies the generation of electricity
74 as one of the main causes of the increase in global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) (IPCC, 2014).
75 Likewise, Article 45 of the Spanish Constitution in force recognizes “*the right to enjoy an adequate*
76 *environment for the development of the person himself and the duty to preserve it*”; and imposes “*a*
77 *mandate on public authorities to ensure the rational use of natural resources to protect and improve the*
78 *quality of life and defend and restore the environment*” (Cortes Generales Españolas, 1978).

79
80 Self-consumption of renewable electricity seems to be one of the most appropriate instruments to reduce
81 the environmental impact of electricity generation (Ascione, 2017; Germani et al., 2015; Norton et al.,
82 2011). Moreover, it is anticipated that, in the medium term (2030), it would not imply a higher levelized
83 cost of electricity (LCOE) than the base electricity mix (fossil and nuclear energy) (CEA, 2016; General
84 Electric International, 2014; Kost et al., 2012; Lu et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2015). The recent outstanding
85 technological developments (Ernst & Young, 2016), linked to the extraordinary high radiation levels in
86 Spain, should promote a high coverage of solar generation (photovoltaic or concentrated). Furthermore,
87 recent studies (Di Francia, 2014; Jäger-Waldau, 2017) show immediate profits for this sort of installations

88 by savings in the energy term of the electricity bill, without the need of any financial aid. Fig. 1 shows
89 how Spain achieves one of the largest differences between the PV LCOE and the price of the energy term
90 for household owners in the retail market.
91




Fig. 1: Price difference between PV levelized electricity cost and household retail prices. Source: (Jäger-Waldau, 2017).

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95
96 On the other hand, Directive 2009/28/EC, in force, establishes an overall and coordinated policy for the
97 production and promotion of energy from RES in the EU (European Commission, 2009). The EU
98 Directive highlights that RES generation offers a greater security for local energy supply, lower losses in
99 energy transportation as generation sources are usually closer to the consumer, and promotes the
100 development and cohesion of the local community by providing sources of income and creating local
101 employment (IEA, 2016).

102
103 Furthermore, energy self-consumption strengthens the energy independence of Spain and favors the
104 reduction of imported fossil fuels, allowing equalization of the trade balance (APPA, 2015; Dabaieh et al.,
105 2016; Mateo et al., 2017). In 2015, Spain imported 1,422 toe less than the previous year thanks to the
106 renewable energy sources (RES) generation, which represented € 357.1 million savings (UNEF, 2017).
107 Electricity generated from grid-connected PV systems contributed 8.3 TWh, representing 3.2% of the
108 Spanish annual electricity consumption, in 2015 (Lacal-Arategui, et al., 2017), although it is estimated
109 for Spain a potential of electric energy generation from solar technologies of 4,266 GWp, where
110 494.5 GWp would be building integrated photovoltaic systems (BIPVs) and 708.4 GWp of ground
111 installed photovoltaic facilities (GREENPEACE, 2018). Thus, it means that the PV sector in Spain is still
112 developed lower than 0.5% of its maximum potential. According to Figs. 2a and 2b, it can be seen that,
113 until 2008, there was a development phase in Spain for PV technology, with a fast growth which showed
114 its maximum for 2008. However, abrupt and unexpected regulatory framework changes in 2009 slowed
115 down completely the solar sector in Spain, with a marked downward trend in the period from 2010 and
116 2014 and a slight recovery since then, although significantly lower than in the first phase (see Fig. 2b).
117 These figures are considerably lower than elsewhere in Europe; such as Italy, Greece or even Germany,
118 where the share of PV energy is in the range from 7 to 8% (see Fig. 2c) (IEA, 2015).

119
120 Despite the described advantages of RES generation and the high availability in Spain, although it was
121 expected that Spain would drive the global solar photovoltaic market in 2008, the Renewable Energy
122 Policy Network for the 21st Century points out that Spain has “*virtually disappeared*” from the solar PV
123 picture. The retroactive policy changes and a new tax on self-consumption (REN21, 2017) made Spain
124 fall from being the largest market in 2008, to a modest fifth place in 2015 in Europe, with regard to the

total installed capacity (Lacal-Arantequi, et al., 2017). As Figs. 2a and 2b show, changes to the regulatory framework (since 2008) have had a detrimental effect both on annual PV capacity, and additions to solar PV capacity for the year 2016, were it is, by far, the lowest of the top-10 countries (Fig. 3). Furthermore, even though there is both a global and European growth trend (see Fig. 3), Spain is not even foreseen to be among the 20 top ranked markets by cumulative historical and forecasted solar PV demand (2001-2022) (Attia et al., 2017), which is a consequence of the energy policy taken by Spanish Governments since 2008. One of the impacts of these policies has been the effect on employment and the local economy: in 2008 the solar photovoltaic industry provided 31,300 jobs in Spain, but a year later, in 2009, there were only 13,900 jobs (Cinco Días, 2009) and in 2015, there were only 7,165 jobs (UNEF, 2017).

As it can be seen from the recent research carried out by López-Prol (López-Prol et al., 2017) on the current regulatory framework for the solar photovoltaic sector in Spain, the average self-consumption in both residential and industrial sectors face negative (residential sector) or negligible (industrial sector) returns. The study shows that, for the current regulatory situation in Spain, and assuming the most "typical" conditions, only commercial solar photovoltaic facilities can have positive returns. However, as this internal rate of return is barely 2% (Lopez-Prol, et al., 2017) it makes any investment quite risky, or at least questionable. A summary of the internal rates of return evaluated by (Lopez-Prol, et al., 2017) are shown in Table I.

As it can be seen in Table I, the current regulation on solar photovoltaic energy is ineffective since, in some sectors, such as the industrial segment, it is more economically beneficial to disconnect the photovoltaic system from the electricity power grid (even, if it implies wasting part of the total generated electricity) to avoid the costs associated with the power grid backup services. This circumstance, apart from being inefficient from the technical point of view, discourages any adjustment on the demand side and is in total contradiction to what the European Commission advocated in its working document "Best practices on Renewable Energy Self-consumption" (European Commission, 2015).

TABLE I. INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN FOR EACH MARKET UNDER AVERAGE CONDITIONS FOR CURRENT SETTINGS OF THE SPANISH REGULATORY FRAMEWORK. Source: (López-Prol et al., 2017).

INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN (%)	TYPE 1 ¹				TYPE 2 ²			
	Equivalent hour conditions (kWh/kWp)	Segments	Residential		Commercial		Industrial	
			Configurations	Backup	No Backup ³	Backup	No Backup	Backup
Average (1328)	Own capital	-6.12	-2.53	2.11	3.59	0.94	3.30	
	Externally financed	-10.06	-5.77	0.67	2.61	-0.21	2.95	

¹ Modality of self-consumption type 1 (according to Royal Decree 900/2015): In the case of a consumer who has a generation facility for his/her own consumption connected inside the network of his point of supply and which is not registered in the corresponding registration as a production facility (although it has to be registered in the Register of Self-Consumption Facilities). In this case, there will be a single subject, which is the consumer. These are small consumers whose facilities are less than 100 kilowatts of installed peak power and which will be allowed to "sell" into the electricity grid the surplus energy they generate without receiving economic compensation for it (although they can be required to apply generation limitations).

² Modality type 2 (according to Royal Decree 900/2015): In the case of a consumer associated with a production facility duly registered in the Administrative Register of Electric Power Production Facilities (as well as in the Register of Self-Consumption Facilities) connected within its network. In this case, there will be two subjects: the consumer and the producer. The Government has established the economic conditions so that the production facilities receiving this modality of self-consumption sell the energy not self-consumed to the system.

³ For the "No Backup" configuration, backup charges established by the RD 900/2015) are not considered.






Fig. 2. (a) Annual PV installed capacity in Spain. Source: Adapted from (PVFINANCING, 2016; Deloitte, 2017; UNEF, 2018); (b) New installed solar PV capacity trends analysis in Spain. Adapted from (PVFINANCING, 2016; Deloitte, 2017; UNEF, 2018); (c) Solar PV capacity and additions, Top 10 Countries, 2016. Source: Adapted from (REN21, 2017).




Fig. 3. Projected scenarios of the European accumulated solar photovoltaic market in 2021.
Source: (UNEF, 2017).

As it can be seen in Table II, installed PV capacity took off in Spain at the beginnings of the 21st Century, outstanding year 2008, when installed capacity growth approximately 500% due to the favorable conditions set by Royal Decree 551/2007. Since then, new installed capacity had negative growth rates (see Fig. 2.b) until 2014 when a slight positive trend is seen again, although much lower than in the past “golden age” for PV installations in Spain.

The average capacity of each generation facility raised from 7.04 kW in 2004 to 76.13 kW in 2016. However, the average size of new PV power plants in the latest five years is observed to be 113.76 kW per installation.

On the other hand, comparing the new installed capacity with the number of installations it can be observed that the equivalent hours, or energy produced per installed capacity unit (MWh/MW) has significantly increased from 739.13 h on average in 2004 to more than 1,200 h on average in 2016. Nevertheless, in the period from 2011 to 2015, the average number of equivalent hours were higher than 1,700 h. This means that, considering similar radiation conditions in the latest decade, installations are getting much more efficient and capacity factors in the range from 19% to 22% are feasible and closer to other RES, such as wind energy power plants (with typically capacity factor ratios in Spain in the range from 25% to 40%).

TABLE II. KEY DATA REGARDING SPANISH SOLAR PV SECTOR. Source: Adapted from (CNE, 2011; CNE 2017).

	INSTALLED CAPACITY (MW)	ELECTRICITY GENERATION (GWh)	NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS	TOTAL SUPPORT (M€)	AVERAGE SUPPORT (€/MWh)
2016	4,675	5,794	61,404	2,764	318
2015	4,663	8,211	61,338	2,863	349
2014	4,646	8,170	61,096	2,805	343
2013	4,637	8,261	60,984	3,265	395
2012	4,510	7,994	59,883	2,855	357
2011	4,247	7,248	57,710	2,665	359
2010	3,839	6,400	54,920	2,897	452
2009	3,630	6,073	52,100	2,868	462
2008	3,463	2,503	51,310	1,155	453
2007	690	473	20,284	215	433
2006	146	99	9,874	45	427
2005	47	38	5,391	16	399
2004	23	17	3,266	6	367

195 Although the research presented in this paper focus specifically in the photovoltaic sector (since it is the
196 most widespread self-consumption sector in Spain), discussion and results can be extended to all
197 distributed RES, such as wind power. From both an extensive survey of grey and scientific literature and
198 a significant number of interviews with experts, it is clear – even though there are many other approaches–
199 that this paper can contribute to the pool of existing knowledge by giving an updated (2018) perspective
200 of the Spanish economic non-market failures and institutional solar PV barriers.

201
202 This paper combines the budgetary requirements of the Spanish Government in the short term with the
203 necessary development of a RES technology, such as solar photovoltaic, which should place an important
204 part of the energy mix of a country characterized by both high levels of solar radiation and energy
205 dependence. To the authors' concerns, it results mandatory an expert judgement approach which proposes
206 in a coherent way, measures to remove existing institutional barriers and economic non-market failures
207 that restrict photovoltaic self-consumption for the Spanish case (updated to the years 2017/2018). This
208 research including an expert judgement approach to the updated scenario (2017/2018) differs from
209 previous studies available in the literature, such as (CNE, 2011; CNE, 2013; CNE 2017; Ramírez et al.,
210 2017; UNEF, 2017) and the results are expected to create outputs with high impact as the measures
211 proposed are likely to produce an impact that itself represents novelty. As a consequence, and by
212 definition, novelty is ensured (Fleming, 2001; Fleming, 2007). Furthermore, the field variety
213 (interdisciplinarity), task variety (division of labor), and the affiliation variety of the authors of this paper
214 (five authors from four different institutions) enable higher access to broader information and generate
215 information advantages that produce more novel outputs (Taylor, 2006; van Knippenberg, 2004). This
216 combination of topics⁴ (an expert judgement approach applied to determining measures to remove
217 institutional barriers and economic non-market failures to short term future PV self-consumption in Spain)
218 further contributes to the novelty of the paper (Mishra, 2016). By conducting the aforementioned
219 “combinatorial originality”, and by performing a thorough literature review and interviews, we ensure the
220 originality of the idea and the information presented here (Lee, 2015).

221
222 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II describes the methods to allow the work
223 to be reproduced. Section III summarizes theoretical arguments, which serve as a basis for the proposition
224 of the measures needed to promote self-consumption in Spain, focusing in particular on the negative
225 impact of both Royal Decree 900/2015 and Law 24/2013 on its development. Section IV shows both
226 identified economic non-market failures and institutional obstacles, which currently discourage the use of
227 solar photovoltaic technology and self-consumption in Spain; this section also shows measures aimed at
228 eliminating those barriers (in Appendix B, it is briefly analyzed which ones have been recently adopted
229 by or are aligned with the latest modification of the regulatory framework in October 2018 through the
230 Royal Decree-Law 15/2018). Finally, in Section V, the importance of the results of the paper as well as
231 its political implications are presented.

232 II. MATERIAL AND METHODS

233 As remarked by Weber in (Weber, 1997), “*energy obstacles are indiscernible, and even though real,*
234 *there is no possibility of breaking them down in an empirical way*”. The different classifications available
235 in the scientific publications are a consequence of assumptions without formal organization or structure
236 (Dunstan et al., 2008; Sorrell et al., 2011). The classification used here derives from (Chai et al., 2012),
237 who categorized energy hurdles in: behavior, market failures, environmental restraints, institutional, and
238 economic non-market failure hurdles. This paper focuses in which experts have arranged to be more

⁴ “...an article published on a combination of topics can be considered novel even if it is not novel in any of its individual topics...” (Mishra, 2016).

239 general and with greater impact: institutional, and economic non-market failure hurdles, while behavioral
240 and environmental restraints will be analyzed in further more specific works.

241
242 Concerning the determination of obstacles to the employment of solar photovoltaic technology and self-
243 consumption in Spain, and taking their specificities into account, a broad review of recent scientific
244 publications related to the topic was undertaken. This information was used to connect with recognized
245 authorities on this topic (see the Acknowledgments section where experts and their affiliation have been
246 included) through an expert judgement approach. Contacts with experts took place between February 2017
247 and June 2017.

248
249 The following seven questions were put to more than 30 experts (both industry and academia experts)
250 in the Spanish self-consumption sector (as an example, a conversation transcript with one of the experts
251 is included as supplementary material):

- 252
253 1. In your opinion, is there any obstacle to the development of self-consumption and, therefore, of
254 the PV sector in Spain?
- 255 2. What measures could be taken to achieve widespread use in the photovoltaic sector in Spain as
256 well as a rapid reduction in costs?
- 257 3. Do you consider it appropriate to recognize the right to self-consumption without any tax being
258 imposed?
- 259 4. Do you think that the Administrative Register of Electric Energy Consumption is a hindrance to
260 the development of the PV sector in Spain?
- 261 5. Do you see a justification for several consumers sharing the same installation?
- 262 6. Do you understand that, according to the corresponding technical regulations, self-consumption
263 facilities that do not transfer electricity into the electricity grid should be legalized?
- 264 7. Do you think it is necessary to adapt the penalty system for self-consumption?

265
266 As a result of the interview survey, material for identifying energy hurdles, their eradication/moderation
267 and determination of whether ongoing energy policies in Spain are satisfactory or not, was collected.
268 Roughly 60 scientific papers/reports were consulted in the research part of this work. Even though this
269 provides valuable information on recent energy hurdles in this field, it should be understood that it would
270 be impossible to review all existing works related to the topic addressed here. The barriers identified by
271 Chai (Chai et al., 2012), Sorrell (Sorrell et al., 2000), and Brown (Brown, 2001), as well as the seven
272 questions shown in this section, were given to 70 experts on solar photovoltaic technology and self-
273 consumption from Spain, of whom 33 (see the Acknowledgements section) suggested different policy
274 measures and validated the scientific literature.

275
276 Barriers analysis in the PV and self-consumption deployment in Spain, where there exists a considerable
277 potential, yet the technically feasible and economically viable measures which could be taken are by no
278 means fully exhausted, is similar to the evaluation of energy conservation and energy savings policies. In
279 this late case, it is called “efficiency gap” or “energy paradox” so, in our case it can be described as “self-
280 consumption gap” or “PV paradox” and, in a similar way, it also could be described in terms of
281 institutional, market-related, organizational and behavioral barriers (Webber, 1997). A deepest exploration
282 and a taxonomy proposal of these barriers can be found in (Blumstein et al., 1980).

284 According to (Chai et al., 2012), it results mandatory to proper identify barriers and propose measures
285 that take them into account in a holistic manner as they usually are characterized by an interconnected
286 nature. The overall effectiveness of energy policies is then limited by the weakest link between identified
287 barriers. This study also identifies the roles and responsibilities of major stakeholders, where highlights
288 the role of Governments and energy service companies. Thus, institutional barriers, which are created by
289 Governments, have a great impact in the policies deployment. On the other hand, (Brown, 2001) provides
290 compelling evidence that large-scale market failures prevent consumers from obtaining energy services at
291 certain conditions. The author in this case, suggests that public interventions can overcome many of the
292 market obstacles. Then, the author proposes a policy portfolio defining different scenarios for a clean
293 energy future in the United States, identifying barriers and ways of addressing them which can be clearly
294 extrapolated to the current European case, specially, the Spanish situation.

295
296 In (Sorrell et al., 2000), a deep analysis of existing barriers to energy efficiency are presented, based in
297 the United Kingdom experience. The authors propose to classify found barriers into three categories:
298 market failures, organizational failures and rational behavior. In related studies from the same authors,
299 barriers of each category are identified for several industrial sectors and an interview protocol for energy
300 manager is presented. That protocol has been adapted in this case for the preparation of the interviews. It
301 must be highlighted that, according to (Sorrell et al., 2000), market failures occur when the basic
302 requirements for efficient allocation of resources through well-functioning markets are violated. This
303 conducts to (i) incomplete markets; (ii) imperfect competition; (iii) imperfect information or; (iv)
304 asymmetric information. From these four market failures, although the two first categories can be
305 important they are less relevant than the other two in energy service markets. On the other hand,
306 organizational failures are those that affect (a) principal-agent relationships within organizations, or; (b)
307 split incentives and appropriability within organizations. Finally, the rational behavior barriers include all
308 those factors that cannot be classified as either market failures or organizational failures (i.e., sunk costs,
309 parallel economic alternatives, technology learning curves, risks, etc.)

310
311 Many research works, such as (Langlois-Bertrand et al., 2015), (Thollander et al., 2010), (Thollander et
312 al., 2013) or (Schleich, 2009) claim the importance of political-institutional barriers in energy efficient
313 development and consider them as main obstacles in a wide range of scenarios. Moreover, it should be
314 noticed that their effect can be amplified due to they often interact between themselves and, even when
315 some barriers are removed, efficient energy policies may remain blocked. Thus, it results of critical
316 importance, to identify these “key” or “reliable” barriers in order to make policy efforts successful
317 (Harmelink et al., 2008). Similar barriers can be found in other energy technologies, such as in
318 cogeneration and district heating networks (Colmenar-Santos et al., 2015). Nevertheless, well designed
319 policies considering potential barriers and with a holistic point of view can harness extraordinary results,
320 like it has been demonstrated related with energy savings in California, Japan and some European
321 countries (Geller et al., 2006).

322
323 To clarify how the returned questionnaires were analyzed, the approach for extracting the interview data
324 is described below and summarized in a flow chart in Fig. 4:

- 325
326 a) First, 41 experts were consulted to identify the main barriers and economic non-market failures
327 that restrict solar photovoltaic self-consumption in Spain. To do so, a “first round” of
328 questionnaires was conducted (see, as an example, Supplementary material S.1).
- 329 b) From data collected from various data sources, including the (in-depth) interviews of the 41 experts
330 from the Spanish solar PV sector, that were mentioned previously and that participated in the
331 conceptual framework development; scientific literature about barriers (Brown, 2001; Chai et al.,

2012; Sorrell et al., 2000); and from normative and legal documents and other public data sources; 16 barrier indicators were identified (see Table A.I).

- c) To give the needed reliability to the questionnaires, it was then necessary to carry out an evaluation of the relative relevance (weight) of each of the barrier indicators through a second consultation with the same experts. Eight out of the 41 experts consulted in the “first round” declined to proceed to the “second round”, with the result that there were 33 experts that finally participated in the identification of the barriers. As result, the conceptual framework of the prospective barriers was developed in this step.
- d) The third conducted step consisted on the quantification of the indicators. To be considered as a “reliable” barrier, it was supposed that the barrier indicators would need to score a “median PV barrier value”⁵ of at least 5.0 on a scale of zero (“not relevant at all”) to ten (“extremely relevant”). The evaluation of the relative weight of each of the 16 tentative barriers (see Table A.I) is a particularly critical issue, because the weighting of them can strongly influence the overall score and, hence, the message provided by the indicator. Then, if a “median PV barrier value” of at least 5.0 on a scale of zero to ten was not reached, the barrier identified by the expert was discarded. Therefore, the weighting of the indicators presented is based on empirical results of a comprehensive process of stakeholder consultation (i.e. from an expert judgement approach process).
- e) From the identified 16 barrier indicators, 11 of them scored at least 5.0 points (those that are coloured red in Table A.I). These 11 barrier indicators were merged into 6 barriers (see Table III).
- f) Once the reliable barriers were identified, they were transferred to the consulted experts who first suggested some modifications (third round) and finally agreed with the “explanation” of the six “final” identified barriers (see Table III).
- g) Finally, measures to remove/mitigate found barriers are presented in the Results and Discussion section (see Table IV). These tables aim to clearly connect Sections III (Analysis of the regulatory framework) and IV (Results and discussion) by linking the issues with the suggestions.




Fig. 4. Flow chart of the “Expert judgement” adopted approach. Source: Own elaboration.

⁵ In this case, the median value was chosen as a more reliable statistic indicator than the average due to the small size of the samples.

362 III. ANALYSIS OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

363 Although it has been presented as a standard for the promotion of DERs, the fact is that the regulation
364 of the regime of self-consumption contained in Royal Decree 900/2015 (Spanish Ministry of Industry,
365 Energy and Tourism, 2015) presents numerous obstacles and uncertainties that predict weak
366 implementation of such a system in the future. There are some positive proposals on energy self-
367 consumption of solar PV in Spain in Royal Decree 900/2015, such as the fact that there is no need for
368 prior authorization for installations below 100 kW, and that it is also not necessary to pay for an access
369 and connection study for Type-1 installations that would have a rated power up to 10 kW.

370
371 Below, some of the more conflicting aspects of Royal Decree 900/2015 are described:

372
373 **III.a Only Type-2 prosumers (net-metering) are entitled to receive a fee for energy being discharged**
374 **into the power grid.** Type-1 consumers (self-consumers) are not entitled to receive any remuneration for
375 surplus energy nor credits⁶, and limits can be set by the Ministry of Industry, Energy, and Tourism
376 (currently known as the Ministry of Ecological Transition) on the generation of this type of energy. This
377 regulation converts Type-1 consumers into a unique scheme among the PV financial compensation
378 policies of developed economies⁷.

379
380 **III.b The implementation of energy-efficient mechanisms does not guarantee consumers enough**
381 **reciprocal advantages⁸ with regard to Royal Decree 900/2015.** This is the consequence of that a
382 discharge to the electricity grid is only authorized in exceptional circumstances; the energy produced
383 may not be higher than the energy consumed in hourly periods, and the consumer must pay for the backup
384 of the energy produced.

385
386 Thus, according to the second additional provision of Royal Decree 900/2015, the consumers of high-
387 voltage electricity, who carry out an activity whose secondary product is the generation of electric energy
388 and, who due to the implementation of a system of savings and energy efficiency, have at certain times
389 electrical energy that cannot be consumed where it is generated, may be authorized by the Ministry of
390 Industry, Energy and Tourism (currently known as the Ministry of Ecological Transition) to sell such
391 energy to the electric grid in exceptional circumstances, provided they meet the requirements established
392 in the Royal Decree, among which is the presentation of a draft of the savings and efficiency measures
393 they will adopt, in which they indicate their electricity consumption.

394
395 It is striking that for these purposes, energy-saving systems that include the installation of a generator, a
396 battery, or energy storage systems are not considered.

397
398 Where electricity selling is authorized, billing the supply and tolls for access to the electricity networks
399 shall be made based on the hourly demand (net hourly electric energy received from the transmission or
400 distribution network) and on all power demanded, in accordance with what is established in Article 9 of
401 Royal Decree 1164/2001 (Jefatura del Estado, 2013). The meter located at the border point of the
402 installation is used for this purpose. The hourly demand can never be negative. The billing of charges or

⁶ Unlike in Spain, in other locations like California, the so-called "net metering" is used, through which prosumer (consumer-generator) credits are granted for the excess electricity generated (the consumer pays only the net amount, in addition to part of the distribution costs and other services) (CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, 2017). In the State of California, renewable facilities of up to 1 MW are eligible for this modality, with the self-consumption limit being up to 5.0% of the aggregate peak demand of each utility (CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, 2017).

⁷ In a study carried out by the International Energy Agency for 18 OECD countries (plus China and Brazil), Spain was found to be the only one in which "the excess PV electricity is not paid at all" (Masson et al., 2016).

⁸ As mentioned above, decentralized energy production has, among other things, many advantages such as greater security of local energy supply and lower energy losses.

403 other prices resulting from applications in accordance with current regulations will be carried out on the
404 demand for energy and on all the demanded power recorded in the meter located at the border point of the
405 installation. In view of this regulation, it can be concluded that the regulation hardly encourages the
406 implementation of energy-efficient mechanisms.

407
408 **III.c Consumer associations are prohibited.** The owner of the energy point of supply will be the same
409 as that of all consumer equipment and generation facilities connected to its network. In no case may a
410 generator be connected to the internal network of several consumers. This prohibition is a clear
411 disadvantage for the communities of particular consumers.

412
413 **III.d As regards the application of access tolls, system costs, and backup costs for self-produced**
414 **energy, Article 18 of Royal Decree 900/2015** (Spanish Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, 2015)
415 **regulates the most controversial aspects of the self-consumption regime.** These are the so-called
416 "system support costs", also called "sun tax"⁹, the amount corresponding to the charge for the other
417 services of the system, which is defined as the payment for the backup function carried out by the entire
418 electricity system to implement self-consumption. This charge applies to the power contracted from the
419 utility and the hourly consumption of electricity, i.e., the net hourly consumption of electricity from
420 generation facilities connected inside a consumer or producer network with which network connection
421 facilities are shared or connected through a direct line.

422
423 **III.e** The most counterproductive aspect of Law 24/2013, with respect to the development of self-
424 consumption in Spain, is the fact that by its application, **self-consumption facilities are obliged to**
425 **contribute to the financing of the costs and services of the electricity system in the same amount as**
426 **other consumers** (Jefatura del Estado, 2013)¹⁰. To this respect it should be pointed out that:

- 427 a) The National Energy Commission (today the National Competition Commission, CNMC) ruled
428 against tolls for self-consumption and suggested using other possible alternatives¹¹, but the
429 Ministry of Industry has chosen to avoid the "leakage" of demand that would provoke consumers
430 to save tolls.
- 431 b) In the opinion of the CNMC, the establishment of a "toll of support" only for self-consuming
432 consumers meant "discriminatory treatment" [see page 18 from (Consejo de Estado, 2015)] with
433 respect to other consumers, who, being able to reduce their consumption if energy efficiency
434 measures were adopted (such as the insulation of their homes or the use of energy-saving lamps),
435 they [sic] would not pay this toll for the energy they could save. As the CNMC points out, the
436 arguments on which this measure sought to justify (both the economic sustainability of the system
437 in the short term and the support provided by the electricity system) were insufficiently
438 robust enough to impute these concepts to self-consumed energy. This is due to the fact that Royal
439 Decree 900/2015 had an impact on the amount of the "back-up toll" for the costs of the whole
440 system but without detracting from the advantages of distributed generation (i.e. without putting
441 in a prospective value), which "does not constitute a good regulation" (Consejo de Estado, 2015).
442 Therefore, the CNMC proposed the elimination of the "toll of support", sacrificing economic

⁹ Due to the current lack of an absolute majority in the Spanish Parliament and to get the approval of the 2017 Spanish Budget, on May 30, 2017 the party in government in that moment (People's Party) and Nueva Canarias reached an Agreement which (except for the Canary Islands) exempts the transitional charge for self-consumed energy for self-consumption facilities that are put into operation before December 31, 2022. This "patch" is exclusive of the Canary Islands and is motivated by the approval of the 2017 Spanish Budget, which demonstrates the lack of rigor that covers this provisional Royal Decree, as well as the need to establish a definitive normative.

¹⁰ This is in conflict with the first Transitional Provision of Royal Decree 900/2015, through which it is possible to observe different fixed charges (depending on the power) and variables (as a function of hourly self-consumption).

¹¹ This could be the establishment of a universal and fixed charge per client that is regarded as part of the sunk costs [see point 4.12 from (CNE, 2013)].

443 efficiency in the short term in the interest of medium and long-term economic sustainability [see
444 pages 5 and 17 from (CNE, 2013)].

- 445 c) As pointed out by the CNMC, the current regime is "unnecessary or disproportionately restrictive"
446 (Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y de la Competencia, 2013) for the production of electric
447 energy in a self-consumption regime (which, in reality, is still a competitive pressure for the rest
448 of the conventional supplies).
- 449 d) For the Ministry of Industry, the economic burden of tariff deficit annuities and aid for renewable
450 energy must be borne by all consumers connected to the grid and by their electricity consumption.
451 If the fall in demand for electricity due to the economic crisis and the depopulation rate were
452 combined with the fall in demand due to self-consumption and net-metering, the sector's income
453 and cost balance would be unattainable without requiring more effort from consumers, which
454 would further encourage self-consumption. In spite of this, the Ministry of Industry is against a
455 generalization of the use of self-consumption and net-metering, which has a clear negative effect
456 on its development in Spain.

457
458 The main economic non-market failures and institutional barriers and uncertainties that hamper the
459 further development of solar photovoltaic technology, self-consumption and net-metering in Spain are
460 presented as a summation of the hurdles presented here (see Table III). To place national analysis in an
461 international context, a succinct comparative study of the existing regulations in Germany, the United
462 States, Israel, China, and Australia is shown in the Appendix (see Table A.II). The purpose of this table is
463 not only to serve as a comparative analysis of existing mechanisms that support self-consumption of
464 electricity in key countries around the world, but rather to highlight the challenges and opportunities
465 associated with their development. As a result, this paper shows the relevance of its focus by comparing
466 Spanish policies with those existing in other countries that, having previously reported similar problems
467 to the one existing in Spain, have addressed them with other energy policies. As a consequence, this paper
468 is relevant to readers from countries other than Spain.

469
470 TABLE III. MOST SIGNIFICANT SPANISH ECONOMIC NON-MARKET FAILURE AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO THE
471 SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGY AND SELF-CONSUMPTION TAKE OFF. Source: Own elaboration.
472

BARRIER INDICATOR NO. (Table A.I)	IDENTIFIED BARRIERS	SUCCINT CONTEXT
1, 3	Consumers of self-consumption Type-1 are not entitled to receive any remuneration for surplus energy ¹² .	Only consumers using Type-2 self-consumption are entitled to receive a fee for energy being discharged into the power grid. To the author's knowledge, in 2016, Spain was the only OECD country where the surplus RES electricity was not paid for at all (Masson et al., 2016). Since the concept of the individual or shared net-metering is not considered in the current regulatory framework in Spain, there is also no credit compensation system (Colmenar-Santos et al., 2015).
2	Only prices (per kWh produced) charged for non-peninsular* electric power systems, and under certain circumstances, can be reduced.	For non-peninsular* Spanish electrical systems, it is not possible to achieve reductions in kWh if the market price of electric energy is lower than the peninsular rate*.
6	The implementation of energy efficiency mechanisms does not guarantee consumers enough reciprocal advantages with regards to Royal Decree 900/2015.	According to the second additional provision of Royal Decree 900/2015, the consumers of high-voltage electricity who carry out an activity whose secondary product is the generation of electric energy and, due to the implementation of a system of savings and energy efficiency, have at certain times electrical energy that cannot be consumed where it is generated; as a general rule, are not authorized to sell such energy to the electric grid.

¹² Consumers with self-consumption of rated power lower than 10 kWp do not have to pay for the energy produced.

5	Consumer associations are prohibited.	The owner of the point of supply will be the same as that of all consumer equipment and generation facilities connected to its network. In no case may a generator be connected to the internal network of several consumers.
8, 10, 11	Application of access tolls, system costs, and backup costs for self-produced energy ¹³ .	There is a charge, the so-called "sun tax", which is defined as the payment for the backup function carried out by the whole electrical system to enable the application of self-consumption.
16	According to Law 24/2013, self-consumption facilities are obliged to contribute to the financing of the costs and services of the electricity system in the same amounts as the rest of the consumers.	This is in conflict with the first Transitional Provision of Royal Decree 900/2015, through which it is possible to observe different fixed charges (depending on the power) and variables (as a function of hourly self-consumption).

473 *In Spain it should be differentiated the peninsular power system, which comprises the national system placed in the Iberian Peninsula and the Balearic Islands
474 (linked to the peninsular power grid through a submarine HVDC power link) and the non-peninsular part, in which the Canary Islands and the Autonomous
475 Cities of Ceuta and Melilla are included. The peninsular system operates through a regulated electricity pool market, coupled with Portugal when there exists
476 enough power exchange capacity, while the non-peninsular systems are operated by economic dispatches.

477 IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

478 In pursuit of legal certainty, Royal Decree 900/2015 on self-consumption must be defined and clarified
479 through a constructive dialogue between all the stakeholders and all the barriers that lack proper
480 justification removed.

481
482 A legal reform that would eliminate the mainly existing obstacles for the development of self-
483 consumption in the electricity sector and, therefore, the photovoltaic sector in Spain and, at the same time,
484 increase savings to the system due to distributed generation (mainly in insular systems) must be promoted
485 and supported. It is precisely on the elimination or, at least, on the mitigation of those barriers that this
486 paper focuses, presenting the necessary measures for accelerating a high PV growth rate and a rapid cost
487 reduction, which is critical to the success of PV deployment in Spain¹⁴.

488
489 This paper proposes an amendment to Article 9 of Law 24/2013 of the electricity sector; the definition
490 of the true cost of power grid backup to self-consumers and net-metering users (substituting the first
491 Transitional Provision of Royal Decree 900/2015); and a repealing of certain provisions of Royal Decree
492 900/2015 of 9 October, which regulates the administrative, technical, and economic conditions of the
493 modalities of electric power supply with self-consumption and production with self-consumption.

494
495 In particular, this paper proposes seven main changes in the regulation of self-consumption, which have
496 been summarized, relating with found economic non-market failures and institutional barriers in Table IV:

497
498 **IV.a** First of all, it is proposed that the right of self-consumption and net-metering of electricity must be
499 recognized, thus avoiding specific taxes for self-consumed electricity¹⁵.

500
501 In doing so, it considers that both instantaneously self-consumed electricity and energy stored in
502 batteries, and subsequently self-consumed, should not involve the payment of additional costs for the use

¹³ This barrier can be lowered for the Spanish non-peninsular electrical systems and certain categories of consumers that have some financial reductions.

¹⁴ As a way of demonstrating the effect of the current regulatory framework in Spain on the development of the photovoltaic sector, in Appendix A (Table IV), information on installed power, electricity production, number of installations, average remuneration per kWh generated, and total support provided is shown. Through Table IV, it can be observed that from 2004, and mainly from 2007, a firm commitment was made to solar photovoltaic energy through Royal Decrees 436/2004 and 661/2007, which established premiums for producers of photovoltaic energy. However, the compensation system established in 2007 was poorly designed since there were no limits on installed capacity, which caused the boom of 2008 installations and all the regulatory chaos that followed. Since 2011, a whole series of rules has been adopted to retroactively cut premiums for renewable energies, which has in fact led to the application of a genuine moratorium on these energy sources (under the pretext of reducing the deficit of the electricity sector) and caused the new RES power capacity installed in the last years to be almost negligible.

¹⁵ As previously mentioned, from a study carried out by the International Energy Agency for 18 OECD countries (plus China and Brazil) (Masson et al., 2016), it was verified that Spain was the "only example" of a specific tax for self-consumers.

503 of the electrical system, as the electricity grid is not used at any time. It is, therefore, a matter of equating
504 the treatment of self-consumption to any other measure of energy saving or efficiency.
505

506 This treatment [successfully implemented in countries such as Germany, Denmark, Japan, Israel, and
507 Mexico (Masson et al., 2016)] has significantly simplified self-consumption modalities to date. As the
508 only relevant issue is the existence (or lack thereof) of surplus, they are still treated like any other modality
509 of electricity production—in the same way as "conventional" electricity consumed by self-consumers is
510 treated under the same conditions as those applying to any other type of consumer.
511

512 **IV.b** Second, it is proposed to enable the possibility of several consumers sharing a self-consumption
513 facility. This arrangement is considered essential if self-consumption is to be developed in the domestic
514 urban environment. To this end, the repeal of Article 4.3 of Royal Decree 900/2015 is proposed.
515

516 In fact, already in 2016, the Government of Catalonia denounced this situation before the Constitutional
517 Court which, in May 2017, declared "unconstitutional" the prohibition of RD 900/2015 of self-
518 consumption facilities for neighborhood communities (Tribunal Constitucional, 2017). Despite this,
519 almost one year after this ruling (May 2018), there is no regulation to carry them out. At the moment,
520 "shared" self-consumption in Spain is not "real"; and a regulation that regulates the procedure to regulate
521 the connection point is needed. In this case, the ideal would be a reform at the whole-country level that
522 would allow us to adapt to the needs of consumption and the evolution of technologies. However, this is
523 an option that, in the short term, does not make sense (looks to be very unlikely to happen). Therefore, it
524 is necessary that each of the regions ("Autonomous Communities"), which have competence in energy
525 matters, take action and set a procedural precedent for the future adoption of legal documents. In this
526 regard, Catalonia has taken the lead and, recently in Barcelona (September 2017) the first shared self-
527 consumption facility has been carried out in a community of neighbors (La Vanguardia, 2017).
528

529 However, and assuming the "worst" of the scenarios, performing this type of facility without a defined
530 regulatory framework (a situation that currently exists in Spain) can have consequences, since it could
531 include taxes that would have to be paid retroactively. Therefore, it is imperative that the governments of
532 the different Autonomous Communities (with powers in energy matters) are those that develop the
533 "unconstitutionality" of the shared self-consumption prohibition in order to avoid further legal problems
534 for the neighboring communities.
535

536 **IV.c** Third, the Ministry of Industry (actually, the Ministry for Ecological Transition) must establish a
537 clear methodology that defines how to calculate the charges that would have to be paid by all users in
538 general, and self-consumers in particular, especially as part of these charges is proportional to the
539 electricity consumed whether it is received from the transmission or distribution network or "self-
540 produced" instantly.

541 As a feasible alternative, a methodology of allocating costs based on the application of charges
542 calculated mainly from fixed terms, which allows recovery of the costs of the system without resorting to
543 variable-term charges applicable to self-consumed energy could be considered.
544

545 **IV.d** Fourth, it should be considered that the processing of facilities in self-consumption with zero
546 injection to the distribution network (Type-1 installations) should revert to the previous self-consumption
547 processing procedure (i.e. before Royal Decree 900/2015 entered into force). This Royal Decree requires
548 that all installations up to 100 kW are processed according to Royal Decree 1699/2011. A point of
549 connection to the utility is requested, and an access contract to the electricity grid is signed regardless of
550 whether or not they inject power into the grid (CIRCUTOR, 2015).
551

552 Instant self-consumption consists of generating one's own electrical energy and consuming it at the
553 same time, with the apparent effect to the utilities that no electricity is demanded. This particular form of
554 electricity generation is showing a notable increase (Colmenar-Santos et al., 2015) despite the current legal
555 situation in some countries, such as Spain. This simplifies and lowers the management of the photovoltaic
556 system for the authorities in a way that makes it equivalent to a diesel generator. By using dynamic power
557 control, the maximum active power generated by the inverter can be controlled and the PV power
558 generated can be only used for self-consumption without any injection to the distribution grid (SMA,
559 2014), so it is not a technical issue. By reverting to the situation as it was before the entry into force of
560 Royal Decree 900/2015, a simplified processing option (according to the Complementary Technical
561 Instruction REBT ITC-BT-40) would be possible.

562
563 Then, the authors of this paper propose the installation of self-consumption systems, simplifying their
564 processing to the maximum extent (CIRCUTOR, 2015; CIRCUTOR, 2017):

- 565
566 a) as grid network-assisted installations in which a parallel connection for the use of the grid AC signal
567 for synchronism is exceptionally allowed, but ensuring both zero electricity injection and a level of
568 protection of the installations connected under the ITC-BT-40.
- 569 b) Or as installations connected to the electricity grid with a guarantee that there is zero electricity
570 injection, and therefore it would not be necessary to have a contract with the utility nor register the
571 activity since there would be no sale of energy.

572
573 In order to maintain the same indices of quality and safety of the electricity supply, it is necessary to
574 (CIRCUTOR, 2015; CIRCUTOR, 2017):

- 575
576 a) install protections to prevent network and autonomous generators working in parallel.
- 577 b) include a device that prevents injection into the network (or provide a technical study that guarantees
578 there is no possibility to inject electric energy to the external grid).
- 579 c) submit a project with details of the protections to the distributor company (which can verify the
580 protections of the connection).

581
582 But, in no case would an administrative registration be required, which has demonstrated to be one
583 significant barrier. This would mean that the procedure required for a DERS would not apply, but would
584 rather be a mere modification of the installation of consumption with associated self-consumption
585 according to the low voltage regulation. Therefore, it is proposed to return to the previous situation where
586 self-consumption facilities that do not inject power into the electricity grid are legalized according to the
587 corresponding technical regulations following the notification procedure without requiring a connection
588 point to be obtained or any other administrative procedure as they would not use the electricity grid. This
589 measure is proposed for the sake of administrative simplification.

590
591 **IV.e** Fifth, it is proposed that a combination of feed-in tariff or feed-in premiums and net-metering
592 mechanisms should be implemented as a support scheme to enable the consumers to compensate their
593 electric consumptions and receive economic compensation for the surplus electric energy that they inject
594 into the electric network; this would also offer the alternative of “credits” per kWh injected to the grid, or
595 “green certificates” which could be negotiated in parallel markets.

596
597 It is true that the combination of the feed-in tariff and the feed-in premium, as a means of retribution, is
598 the basis of the development of the photovoltaic sector in leading countries like Germany (see Table A.II,

599 which shows a comparison of the remunerations for the case of Germany, the United States, Israel, China,
600 Australia, and Spain). However, it is also a fact that these compensation schemes can have a negative
601 impact on the reliability of the electricity network (since they imply a guaranteed connection to the same,
602 regardless of where the generators are located), and they also implicitly represent a distortion of electricity
603 prices in the wholesale market (Lesser et al., 2008; Menanteau et al., 2003).

604
605 On the other hand, “pure” net-metering policies, despite being successful in the development of specific
606 technologies with a limited implementation, presents the problem of long-term remuneration, so it
607 represents a barrier (EPIA, 2013).

608
609 Based on evaluations, made specifically for Spain, that have been shown to be "a viable option for PV
610 development" (Ramírez et al., 2017), a combination of net-metering and feed-in tariff is adequate to solve
611 each problem separately at the time that the development of solar photovoltaic technology and self-
612 consumption is achieved in Spain. As a consequence, this combined policy mechanism is the one proposed
613 in this paper.

614
615 As studied by (Ramírez et al., 2017), PV energy generation is not profitable in most cases (7 top PV
616 producers in Europe) without the support of an electricity compensation scheme. Results are only
617 favorable once the FiT price rate achieves a greater level than the electricity costs. Then, a full net-
618 metering or self-consumption scheme are feasible once upfront costs are low enough to make PV energy
619 economically profitable. The only other possibility is a scenario where electricity prices are high enough
620 to balance those costs. Moreover, the authors remark that plant size is a key factor as scale economies still
621 influence in a high amount the PV market. This fact must be considered when defining domestic self-
622 consumption promoting energy policies. However, the excellent solar irradiation levels in Spain makes it
623 one of the most attractive countries to invest in PV projects.

624
625 Considering all previously described considerations, results in (Ramirez et al., 2017) show that the
626 optimal PV self-consumption option in Spain should be a scheme which prioritizes FiT against net-
627 metering. Feasible FiT/net-metering rates should be from 75/25 to 100/0, where estimated minimum
628 FiTs¹⁶ are achieved in the simulations (from 120 €/MWh for 1 MW installed capacity facilities, up to
629 240 €/MWh for 5 kW rated power fixed PV power plants). On the contrary to other similar irradiation
630 countries, like Italy, the higher the FiT/net-metering rate, the better.

631
632 Nevertheless, the accurate FiT/net-metering ration and the FiT minimum must be defined according to
633 the location (irradiation levels) and the size of the power plant.

634
635 **IV.f Sixth, Royal Decree 900/2015 overlooks smart grids and self-consumption, potential ancillary**
636 **services to stabilize the grid, not remunerating services, and not allowing small players to participate in**
637 **the balancing market.**

638
639 A smart grid can always be defined through three types of nodes: generation nodes, consumption
640 nodes, and the point of interconnection. Normally, the control of such micro-grids is carried out by the
641 management of the variables of the point of interconnection with the utilities. Depending on the
642 application, these variables can exchange real and reactive power, or voltage and frequency control,

¹⁶ The authors in (Ramirez et al., 2017) introduce the concept of FiT minimum as the minimum FiT price that makes the investment profitable.

643 respectively. In all these cases, a fourth type of node must be used to allow full management of smart
644 grids: an energy storage node.

645
646 The use of energy storage systems in photovoltaic plants allows for the optimum performance of all
647 applications in the photovoltaic system. In self-consumption-oriented plants, energy storage systems allow
648 for minimal exchanges with the grid, which increases the percentage of use of energy from photovoltaic
649 sources. If the Spanish regulations facilitated it (as already happens, for example, in countries like
650 Singapore or Malaysia), this increase of self-consumption could bring an extra benefit to the operation of
651 the systems. In this case, energy storage systems would allow the use of extra energy that has not been
652 used during the day.

653
654 Smart grids would allow participation in the regulation of both frequency and voltage, which is
655 particularly interesting in the case of weak electrical grids, such as those in insular systems like the Canary
656 Islands in Spain. Frequency regulation would be done through storage systems, as the power source is not
657 always available (batteries, in this case, should be sized to obtain the power required by the system
658 operator). The regulation of the voltage, on the other hand, would be carried out through the injection or
659 the consumption of reactive power. Such reactive power could be supplied by a photovoltaic inverter,
660 provided it has an extended reactive power supply capability (Colmenar-Santos et al., 2016).

661
662 As a consequence, recognition of the value of the services offered by storage systems is central to
663 creating the business case for storage and will be proposed in this paper, including rewards for grid services
664 and overall capacity of energy storage to stabilize quality and supply for renewables generation. This
665 recognition should be made both for its capability to efficiently regulate the voltage level locally and for
666 the capacity to interrupt and move the electric load at the DSO or TSO command.

667
668 Particularly, it can be proposed a similar mechanism that currently works in the Spanish wholesale
669 market for generators which are allowed to offer their capability for voltage regulation on the one hand,
670 and, on the other hand, for intensive energy consumers, to interrupt their electric consumption. While the
671 voltage control ancillary service has been largely operated in the Spanish power grid, the interruption
672 service has been implemented just a few years ago. However, this service has been operating in other
673 countries, like the UK since long time ago.

674
675 The voltage service is remunerated (partially is a mandatory service for the connected generators to
676 the power grid) according to the reactive power that each generator is capable to inject or absorb to the
677 power grid, at a certain moment. It is offered to the TSO, who organizes the offers from the most economic
678 to the least (competitive tender). The interruption service, on the other hand, is completely voluntary
679 (although a potential bidder must be technically approved by the TSO) and bidders can offer energy
680 interruption blocks of 5 MW or 90 MW (with very high availability) with three execution options: (i)
681 instantaneous; (ii) quick execution (15 minutes); or (iii) hourly (minimum advice two hours earlier of the
682 execution) (Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism, 2010; Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism,
683 2010).

684
685 Although distributed energy storage systems integrated in self-consumption facilities which would
686 provide voltage control and interruption services (that significantly help with the frequency regulation in
687 a similar way as the load shedding) may have lower sizes (hundreds of kW instead of tenths of MW) its
688 location in the distribution network results a great advantage as voltage and frequency disturbances should
689 affect locally (Delfino et al., 2018). Then, adapted tender mechanisms for both services, in an appropriate
690 power size scale, seems to be feasible and, thus, it is proposed.

691

692 **IV.g** Finally, this paper proposes to adapt the sanctioning regime concerning self-consumption to the true
 693 impact of the same in the electricity sector.

694
 695 The Government has included in its Royal Decree of Self-Consumption (RD 900/2015) fines of up to
 696 € 60 million for self-consumers who fail to comply with the Royal Decree. If we compare this amount
 697 with the € 30 million maximum set for the abandonment or release of radioactive materials (El
 698 Confidencial, 2015), it can be understood how disproportionate this Royal Decree is.

699
 700 TABLE IV. PROPOSED MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE ECONOMIC NON-MARKET FAILURES AND INSTITUTIONAL
 701 BARRIERS THAT HINDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGY AND SELF-CONSUMPTION IN
 702 SPAIN. Source: Own elaboration.
 703

IDENTIFIED BARRIERS	MEASURES PROPOSED	JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSED MEASURE
According to Law 24/2013, self-consumption facilities are obliged to contribute to the financing of the costs and services of the electricity system in the same amounts as the rest of the consumers.	The right to self-consumption of electricity is to be recognized and without the application of any charges for electricity self-consumed.	In doing so, it considers that both instantaneously self-consumed electricity and energy stored in batteries, and subsequently self-consumed, should not involve the payment of additional costs for the use of the electrical system, as the electricity grid is not used at any time. It is, therefore, a matter of equating the treatment of self-consumption to any other measure of energy saving or efficiency.
Consumer associations are prohibited.	Possibility of several consumers sharing a self-consumption facility.	This arrangement is considered essential for self-consumption to be developed in the domestic urban environment.
Application of access tolls, system costs, and backup costs for self-produced energy.	The Ministry of Industry/for Ecological Transition, must establish a clear methodology that defines how to calculate the charges paid.	This is justified by the fact that part of the charges paid by all users in general, and self-consumers in particular, are proportional to the electricity consumed, whether it is received from the transmission or distribution network or "self-produced" instantly.
	Self-consumption facilities that do not inject power into the electric grid should not be required to obtain a connection point or perform any other administrative procedure.	Since these facilities would not be using the electric grid, there would be no point in having this administrative burden.
Consumers of self-consumption Type-1 are not entitled to receive any remuneration for surplus energy ¹⁷ .	Implementation of a combination of feed-in tariff and net-metering.	This support scheme would enable prosumers to compensate for their electricity consumption and receive economic compensation for the excess electric energy they inject into the electricity grid. This would help prevent the problems associated with the feed-in tariff, net metering, and wholesale market price minus taxes schemes, or the total lack of remuneration (as in the case of Spain, when the installed power is less than 100 kW).
The implementation of energy efficiency mechanisms does not guarantee consumers enough reciprocal advantages with regards to Royal Decree 900/2015. Only prices (per kWh produced) charged for non-peninsular electric power systems, and only under certain circumstances, can be reduced.	Rewards for grid services and overall capacity of energy storage to stabilize quality and supply for renewables generation.	Royal Decree 900/2015 overlooks smart grids and self-consumption, potential ancillary services to stabilize the grid, not remunerating these services, and not allowing small generators to participate in the balancing market.
The implementation of energy efficiency mechanisms does not guarantee consumers enough reciprocal advantages with regards to the Royal Decree 900/2015.	Adapt sanctioning regime concerning self-consumption to the true impact of the same in the electricity sector.	The Government has included in its Royal Decree of Self-Consumption (RD 900/2015) fines of up to € 60 million for self-consumers who fail to comply with the Royal Decree. If this amount is compared with the € 0 million maximum set for the abandonment or release of radioactive materials, it can be understood how disproportionate this Royal Decree is.

704
 705 It should be borne in mind that the measures proposed in this paper do not imply an increase in the
 706 credits requested by the Spanish government or a decrease in budgetary revenue. Indeed, after the entry
 707 into force of Law 24/2013, the balance between costs and revenues of the electricity system is guaranteed
 708 so that a potential imbalance would be corrected automatically without generating a tariff deficit and,
 709 therefore, no requirement whatsoever of budgetary burden.
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¹⁷ Consumers with self-consumption of rated power lower than 10 kWp do not have to pay for the energy produced, but they cannot inject surplus energy.

In addition, for the calculation of application access tolls since 1 January 2016, the Government has considered a forecast of electricity demand lower than that estimated by the CNMC based on data from the operator of the system (TSO). In view of the small size of the production facilities associated with solar photovoltaic technology and self-consumption, it can be considered that their effect on the income of the electricity system will be negligible in the first years and, in any case, of the same order of magnitude as the errors in the estimation of the electric demand, which will necessarily occur. Furthermore, as in other countries and USA states, if the recommendations proposed in this paper for self-consumption and net-metering produce distortions in the power system, any of these rules can be modified in the future. The beneficial effects of solar photovoltaic technology and self-consumption, both on the electricity system itself (reduction of losses in the network and reduction of prices in the wholesale market derived from the displacement of marginal technologies) and on the rest of the economy (creation of employment, positive fiscal impact derived from investment, etc.), offset the revenue reduction that could be caused on the electrical grid power system.

Bearing the above in mind, it will be proved here how the measures proposed, measures that are expected to promote the development of the solar PV technology in Spain, will improve the economics of solar power. To do that, potential losses and benefits from adopting this technology will be compared.

Currently in Spain, and considering the MINETAD self-consumption registry (MINETAD, 2018), there is an installed power of self-consumption of about 867.5 MW, which are distributed in cogeneration, biomass, bioliquid and biogas installations, waste energy, wind, photovoltaic, hydroelectric, diesel engines and other thermal power plants. According to the total installed power at a national level (peninsular and non-peninsular), – around 105 GW – the self-consumption that encompasses all the technologies present in the Registry, represents 0.82% of the installed capacity in Spain. Considering electricity consumption values of Red Eléctrica de España (the national TSO), it is estimated that, from the approximately 265,000 GWh demanded in 2016, around 3,000 GWh were self-consumption, which means that 1.19% of the demand for self-consumption is currently covered. Of these 3,000 GWh, self-consumption generated from RES is only 576 GWh, which represents a 0.22% coverage of the electric consumption. If only photovoltaic installations were considered, this percentage drops to 0.01%. Table V presents these data about electricity coverage.

TABLE V. DEMAND COVERAGE PERCENTAGE FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF SELF-CONSUMPTION. Source: Adapted from MINETAD, 2018.

DEMAND COVERAGE	PERCENTAGE
Demand coverage with installed facilities for self-consumption	1.19%
Demand coverage with only RES self-consumption	0.22%
Demand coverage with only solar PV self-consumption	0.01%

However, it must be noted that self-consumption in cogeneration facilities is exempt from the payment of the back-up toll according to the fourth transitory provision “Exemptions of the charges associated with the system’s costs and the charge for other system services” in Royal Decree 900/2015. This means that approximately 95% of the cogeneration facilities will not assume payment of these charges until 1 January 2020. As a consequence, the percentage of self-consumption facilities that are subject to the payment of the backup toll is reduced from 1.19% to 0.46%. Considering the current installed power of self-consumption and the assumption of an average electricity wholesale price of € 50/MWh (ENDESA, 2017), the loss of revenues from the Electric Pool would be as shown in Table VI.

757 TABLE VI. POTENTIAL REVENUE REDUCTION CAUSED TO THE ELECTRIC POWER SYTEM AS A RESULT OF THE
 758 ADOPTION OF SELF-CONSUMPTION. Source: Adapted from ENDESA, 2017; MINETAD, 2018.
 759

DEMAND COVERAGE	DEMAND COVERAGE PERCENTAGE	REVENUE REDUCTION
Coverage demand with installed facilities for self-consumption	0.46%	€ 59,817,789.55
Coverage demand with only RES self-consumption	0.22%	€ 28,835,983.55
Coverage demand with only solar PV self-consumption	0.01%	€ 1,257,474.51

760
 761 That is to say, the real value of the loss of revenues of the Electric Pool considering the data of the Self-
 762 consumption register (MINETAD, 2018) would be almost € 29 million for all renewable self-consumption
 763 and € 1.2 million for photovoltaic self-consumption. Therefore, the loss of taxes associated with the
 764 decrease in income in the market would reach the values presented in Table VII.

765
 766 TABLE VII. POTENTIAL DIRECT TAXES LOST AS A RESULT OF THE ADOPTION OF SELF-CONSUMPTION. Source:
 767 Adapted from AGENCIA TRIBUTARIA, 2017; ENDESA, 2017; MINETAD, 2018.
 768

DEMAND COVERAGE PERCENTAGE	GENERATION TAX (7%)	ELECTRICITY SPECIAL TAX (5.11%)	VAT (21%)	LOSS OF DIRECT TAXES
0.46%	€ 10,736,548.01	€ 7,837,680.04	€ 32,209,644.02	€ 19,805,670.12
0.22%	€ 2,018,518.85	€ 1,473,518.76	€ 6,055,556.55	€ 9,547,594.15
0.01%	€ 88,023.22	€ 64,256.95	€ 264,069.65	€ 416,349.81

769
 770 Figures in Table VII allow us to verify that the loss of income from taxes would be € 9.5 million for all
 771 renewable technologies, and € 0.4 million if only photovoltaic self-consumption was considered. From
 772 the Government perspective, once the reduction in incomes due to self-consumption was calculated, it was
 773 necessary to calculate the loss of income from tolls and taxes associated with this income. To analyze the
 774 economic repercussions produced in the event that consumers choose to implement a self-consumption
 775 electricity installation, we have to consider that self-consumers would continue paying the “power term”,
 776 with which most of the fixed costs of the electricity system are absorbed and would stop paying the “energy
 777 term” for self-consumed energy. From the tolls linked to the term of energy and with the energy
 778 consumptions of the tariffs considered, we will obtain an average toll that will allow us to estimate the
 779 reduction of income, both for access tolls and for electricity taxes.

780
 781 According to a recent report (December 2017) of the National Commission of Markets and Competition
 782 (CNMC, 2017), which establishes the electric power access tolls for 2018, the system costs are equal to
 783 approx. € 18,000 million, of which about € 11,000 million are charges, of which approximately 75%
 784 comes from tolls. That is, the tolls would cover some € 8,400 million of charges, of which approximately
 785 30% is paid as a variable charge, about € 2,500 million. In compliance with Order IET/107/2014 and
 786 Order IET/2735/2015, we were able to assign a percentage of consumption to each tariff. The average toll
 787 allowed us to estimate the reduction of income. To calculate it, we considered the energy consumed and
 788 the rate of consumption of the tariffs. Therefore, considering all these considerations and the current
 789 installed power of self-consumption, the loss of taxes associated with tolls are presented in Table VIII.

790
 791 TABLE VIII. POTENTIAL TOLLS AND ITS DIRECT RELATED TAXES LOST CAUSED AS A RESULT OF THE ADOPTION OF
 792 SELF-CONSUMPTION. Source: Adapted from CNMC, 2017; AGENCIA TRIBUTARIA, 2017; ENDESA, 2017; MINETAD, 2018.
 793

DEMAND COVERAGE PERCENTAGE	LOSS OF REVENUES FROM ELECTRICITY “TOLLS” (€)	ELECTRICITY SPECIAL TAX (5.11%)	VAT (21%)	LOSS OF TAXES DUE TO A REDUCTION OF INCOME FROM ELECTRICITY “TOLLS” (€)
0.46%	€ 11,806,769.38	€ 730,024.36	€ 2,479,421.57	€ 3,209,445.93
0.22%	€ 5,691,614.65	€ 351,918.23	€ 1,195,239.08	€ 1,547,157.30
0.01%	€ 248,198.93	€ 15,346.39	€ 52,121.78	€ 67,468.16

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In summary, considering only renewable self-consumption, the “negative” impact would be € 21.5 million; and considering only the photovoltaic self-consumption, this figure would fall below € 2 million euros (to be exact, € 1.74 million).

Then, if according to the Registry (MINETAD, 2018), 16 MW of photovoltaic self-consumption corresponds to a loss of income in the system of about € 1.74 million, thus in the event that 100 MW was entered into the system in one year, the loss of income would not be more than € 11 million. Assuming CO₂ emission rights of € 13.54/ton and knowing the intensity of primary energy in Spain (Ministry of Energy, Tourism and Digital Agenda, 2017), an accumulated power of 100 MW of photovoltaic solar energy would have the impact on the environment and on energy dependence as shown in Table IX.

TABLE IX. IMPORTS OF FOSSIL FUELS AVOIDED AND ECONOMIC SAVINGS FOR A 150 GWh SELF-CONSUMPTION SOLAR PV SCENARIO. Source: Adapted from Ministerio de Energía, Turismo y Agenda Digital, 2017; SENDECO, 2018.

GENERATION (GWh)	150
IMPORTS OF FOSSIL FUELS AVOIDED (toe)	33,871
ECONOMIC SAVINGS AS A RESULT OF NOT IMPORTING FOSSIL FUELS (€)	6,394,692
CO ₂ EMISSIONS AVOIDED (TONS)	87,803
ECONOMIC SAVINGS BY EMISSIONS (€)	1,188,843

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According to the contemplated scenario, 150 GWh of self-consumed energy would avoid importing 33,871 toe per year and the emission into the atmosphere of 1,756,513 tons of CO₂, which would entail savings of about € 7.5 million. It should also be noted that there are other potential benefits of self-consumption, such as a reduction of energy dependence; a potential reduction of prices in the wholesale market derived from the displacement of marginal technologies¹⁸; creation of (local) employment; or a positive fiscal impact derived from investment, etc., even real, have not been considered in the income evaluation due to their inherent subjectivism. As a consequence, those losses of € 3.5 million that result from applying a pure “legal” perspective are expected to be offset if those “subjective” elements are taken into account. As already mentioned, if the recommendations proposed in this paper for self-consumption and net-metering produce distortions in the power system, any of the rules proposed in this work can be modified in the future.

821 V. CONCLUSIONS

822 Due to its regulatory inconclusiveness, which implies that, *de facto*, Royal Decree 900/2015 is currently
823 under development, current legislation is a burden to the development of self-consumption in Spain. In
824 this sense, it restricts any renewable facility that intends to develop in this manner. Irrespective of the
825 existence of the Administrative Register of Electric Power Consumption, the spirit of the current
826 legislation affects the development of the sector in Spain. This paper proposes a stable legal framework
827 design, which contemplates the implementation of distributed generation systems as envisioned by the
828 Electricity Sector Law, in line with the provisions of Directive 2009/28/EC, without neglecting net-
829 metering, to allow for the management of electricity self-consumption systems. Adapting the successful
830 energy policies executed by Germany, the EU leader in terms of PV installed, and other developed
831 countries, measures that are relevant to the Spanish situation are proposed to promote the deployment of
832 its PV sector, especially for distributed generation facilities target to the self-consumption. For
833 comparative purposes, it can be seen that policies with the aim to charge the electricity consumers to
834 finance Transportation & Distribution (known as "solar tax"), imposed taxes on batteries, or the non-

¹⁸ The potential reduction of the wholesale prices of electricity is linked to the characteristic technology’s kurtosis factor.

835 existence of revenues from excess electricity for facilities below 100 kW, differ radically from the policies
836 promoted in other countries. This paper combines the budgetary requirements of the Spanish Government
837 in the short term with the necessary development of a technology such as solar photovoltaic, which should
838 be an important part of the energy mix of a country with both high levels of solar radiation and energy
839 dependence, such as Spain is. If the recommendations set out in this paper were taken into account, the
840 energy policy implications are that both generation and distributed storage as well as self-consumption
841 would be encouraged. The energy would preferably be generated from renewable and manageable sources.
842 Furthermore, the resulting regulation would be much easier for consumers to implement and for the
843 network operators and competent administrations to supervise, which strengthens the importance of the
844 measures proposed throughout this paper and suggests the necessity to update the Royal Decree on Energy
845 Self-Consumption, if it is desired that self-consumption in general, and solar photovoltaic technology, in
846 particular, were to be deployed in Spain as it is in other solar PV world-leading countries.

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1007

1008

1009 APPENDIX A

1010 TABLE A.I. QUESTIONNAIRE AND “SECOND ROUND” RESULTS FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE RELEVANCE OF
1011 INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS AND ECONOMIC NON-MARKET FAILURES THAT RESTRICT PHOTOVOLTAIC SELF-

1012 CONSUMPTION IN SPAIN. Source: Own elaboration.

NO.	BARRIER INDICATOR	OBS.	MEDIAN PV BARRIER INDICATOR VALUE*	MINIMUM BARRIER INDICATOR VALUE*	MAXIMUM BARRIER INDICATOR VALUE*
1	Existence and reliability of solar PV strategy and support scheme	33	6.9	3	10
2	Relative remuneration level of solar PV	33	5.3	4	10
3	Solar PV revenue risk	33	9.2	3	10
4	Access to finance	33	4.3	2	10
5	Fair and independent regulation of the solar PV sector	33	8.1	4	10
6	Existence of functioning and non-discriminatory short-term markets for solar PV	33	5.8	3	9
7	Availability of reliable long-term contracts (PPA)	33	3.5	3	10
8	Grid access cost	33	5.5	0	10
9	Solar PV grid access lead time	33	4.3	3	10
10	Utility and transparency of grid connection procedures	33	5.2	2	10
11	Treatment of solar PV access and curtailment	33	5.8	2	9
12	Transparency and predictability of grid development	33	4.4	2	9
13	Administrative costs	33	4.8	0	10
14	Duration of administrative procedures	33	3.8	2	9
15	Administrative complexity	33	4.3	3	9
16	Integration of solar PV in spatial and environmental planning	33	5.6	4	10

1013 * 10 = Extremely relevant, 5 = Moderately relevant, 0 = Not relevant.

1014

TABLE A.II. COMPARISON BETWEEN SPANISH AND OTHER SELF-CONSUMPTION SCHEMES AROUND THE WORLD. Source: Adapted from (Masson et al., 2016).

			SPAIN		GERMANY	UNITED STATES	ISRAEL	CHINA	AUSTRALIA
			Below 100 kW	Above 100 kW					
PV Self-consumption	1	Right to self-consume	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	2	Revenues from self-consumed PV	Savings on the electricity bill	Savings on the electricity bill	Savings on the electricity bill	Savings on the electricity bill	Savings on the electricity bill	Savings on the electricity bill + bonus	Savings on the electricity bill
	3	Charges to finance Transportation & Distribution	Yes (“solar tax”)	Yes (“solar tax”)	None	In specific states	None	None	Tariff structure changes in some states
Excess PV electricity	4	Revenues from excess electricity	None	Wholesale market price minus taxes	Feed-in Tariff (FiT) or Feed-in Premium (FiP)	Retail Electricity Prices (full net-metering)	Retail Electricity prices (full net-metering)	Market price + bonus	Feed-in Tariff
	5	Maximum timeframe for compensation	Real-time	Real-time	Real-time	Vary by state	2 years	Real-time	30 minutes
	6	Geographical compensation	None	None	On site only	On-site	Credits can be transferred to other consumers (but without transmission and distribution costs)	On site only	On site only
Other system characteristics	7	Regulatory scheme duration	Unlimited	Unlimited	20 years Feed-in Tariff (FiT)	Unlimited	Unlimited	20 years	Unlimited but FiT are revised annually
	8	Third party ownership accepted	None	Yes	All	Yes	Yes	None	Yes (e.g. Solar Leasing)
	9	Grid codes and additional taxes/fees	Above 10 kW (except the Canary and Baleares islands)	Yes (except the Canary and Baleares islands)	Grid codes compliance and partial EEG-surcharge	Vary by state. e.g. in Massachusetts, net energy metering is calculated monthly with a minimum bill. Arizona utilities have implemented fixed charges to account for grid costs	System costs – grid, back-up and balancing costs	None	Yes (Injection control/ramp-rate control/no DC-injection)
	10	Other enables of self-consumption	None	None	Battery storage incentives	Time of use tariff in some states	None	None	None
	11	PV system size limitations	100 kW but below or equal to capacity contracted	Below or equal to capacity contracted	Minimum 10% of self-consumption	Yes, but depends on the state: from 10 kW to 10 MW (or no limit)	5 MW	20 MW – 35 kW	None
	12	Electricity system limitations	Distributor’s License	Distributor’s License	52 GW of PV installations	In some states	No, but costs are linked to PV penetration	7 GW for distributed PV installations	None (except additional grid codes)
	13	Additional features	Taxes on batteries	Taxes on batteries	Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) levy must be paid anyway by the prosumer (>10 kW)	Multiple other policies depending on the state or at federal level	None	None	None

1 APPENDIX B

2 B.1. LATEST UPDATES IN THE SPANISH ENERGY SECTOR REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

3 During the review process of this paper, Government in Spain, through the Ministry for Ecological
4 Transition (formerly called Ministry of Industry, Energy and Tourism), approved the Royal Decree-Law
5 15/2018 of 5 October, on urgent measures for the ecological transition and the protection of the consumers
6 (Spanish Ministry for Ecological Transition, 2018), which significantly modifies the existing regulatory
7 framework. The main justification of this suddenly regulatory framework revision was the unaffordable
8 increment of the wholesale prices of electricity and the intentions of the new cabinet to accelerate the
9 transition to a decarbonized economy.

10
11 Apart from the approval of several measures to avoid the energy poverty and to protect the most
12 vulnerable energy consumers (Title I of the Royal Decree-Law 15/2018) and the promotion of the
13 sustainable electric mobility (Title IV), the new regulation focuses on the self-consumption policies (Title
14 II) and the integration of renewable energy sources (Title III).

15 As main modifications regarding the self-consumption policies, which specially concerns this paper, it
16 should be highlighted:

- 17
18 (a) The self-consumption modalities are reduced to just two: with and without energy injection. In this
19 late case, there would be only the role of consumer, while electricity injection allowed facilities must
20 distinguish between the generator and the consumer.
- 21 (b) The elimination of tolls for self-consumed energy.
- 22 (c) The administrative definition of “self-consumption” is modified and it is recognized the right of
23 running shared self-consumption facilities, allowing private owners communities the installation of
24 their self-consumption generators, taking advantage of scale economies.
- 25 (d) The promotion of the simplification of the administrative process to authorize low size generation
26 facilities (i.e. installations of rated power up to 100 kW, even with electricity injection capacity, are
27 exempted to be registered in the Registry of Energy Producers).
- 28 (e) The new regulatory framework admits the possibility of introducing net-metering mechanisms for
29 unbalances lower than 100 kW.
- 30 (f) The Royal Decree-Law proposes to develop the concept of “close self-consumption facilities” which
31 may include not only inner generators on consumers’ facilities but also those generation systems
32 connected to an electrical consumer through a direct electric wire or the low voltage distribution grid
33 derived from the shared power transformation station.

34
35 Regarding the promotion of the RES integration in the power grid, (i) new mechanisms to guarantee the
36 investments from energy auctions are included; (ii) grid access and connection permissions for RES
37 generators given previously to Law 24/2013 are extended and; (iii) new measures to avoid speculation
38 with RES projects are proposed.

39
40 Although it results mandatory a complete development of the presented new regulatory framework (the
41 Government commit itself to act within 3 months) it should be noticed that (a) those existing regulatory
42 conditions which have been pointed out in this paper will be cancelled, as proposed, for being clearly
43 unfair conditions for energy prosumers in Spain, and (b) New measures depicted in the new Law are
44 strongly aligned with those proposed in this work. Thus, the “expert judgement approach” presented in
45 this paper shows to be realistic and effective.

46

47 As final remark, the authors expect that the new regulatory framework will consider the rest of the
48 proposed measures in this work as they are intended to accelerate the Spanish transition to a more fare,
49 clean and sustainable energy generation scenario.

1 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

2 S.1 CONVERSATION TRANSCRIPT WITH ONE OF THE EXPERTS, DR. ROSA MARÍA REGUEIRO FERREIRA (SEE
3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS SECTION) FOR EXAMPLE PURPOSES

4 **[Interviewer] In your opinion, is there any obstacle to the development of self-consumption and, therefore, of the photovoltaic sector**
5 **in Spain?**

6 [Expert answer]: The current legislation is a clear obstacle for the development of self-consumption in Spain, in particular by what is
7 established in Royal Decree 900/2015. In this sense, it restrains any type of renewable facility that purports to develop under this perspective.

8 **[Interviewer] What measures could be taken to achieve an acceleration of the photovoltaic sector in Spain and a rapid reduction of**
9 **costs?**

10 [Expert answer]: Firstly, to design a stable legal framework, which contemplates the implementation of distributed production systems, for
11 example from the Electricity Sector Law and in line with Directive 2009/28/EC. Neither should the net balance be left aside to allow the
12 management of self-consumption electric systems. The elimination of the fixed cost by installation of accumulating batteries would allow to
13 obtain a reduction of costs, although with a new system of charging of costs to the whole energy mix that also considered the environmental
14 cost, the overall cost would be reduced.

15 **[Interviewer] Do you consider it appropriate to recognize the right to self-consumption without any tax being imposed?**

16 [Expert answer]: The right to self-consumption is related to a business model based on shared ownership. If there is a penalty system it should
17 be proportional to the size of the facilities, and not allow the current situation, where there is a capital disproportion that penalizes the
18 establishment of new renewable facilities.

19 **[Interviewer] Do you believe that the Administrative Register of Electric Energy Consumption is a drag on the development of the**
20 **photovoltaic sector in Spain?**

21 [Expert answer]: The spirit of the current legislation is affecting the development of the sector in our country, beyond the existence of this
22 registry.

23 **[Interviewer] Do you see a justification for several consumers sharing the same installation?**

24 [Expert answer]: Totally, it is a model that has been working in other European countries for more than 30 years and with fantastic results.

25 **[Interviewer] Do you understand that, according to the corresponding technical regulations, self-consumption facilities that do not**
26 **inject electricity into the electricity grid should be legalized?**

27 [Expert answer]: The legalization of a facility should be studied and considered at least to ensure the operational safety of the facility.

28 **[Interviewer] Do you think it necessary to adapt a penalty regime for self-consumption?**

29 [Expert answer]: As I indicated earlier, yes. Sanctions should be proportional to the size of the facility.